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11 Introduction
Uncertainty and private information are crucial in modern economies. Agents
know that their decisions can lead to diﬀerent outcomes, depending on the deci-
sions of others, and on the state of the environment. The complexity associated
with these issues is such that it cannot be completely captured by any simple
model. A realistic goal is to ﬁnd simple models that give enlightening, although
partial, descriptions.
In general equilibrium theory, several proposals have been made regarding the
introduction of private information. We restrict our analysis to a model in which
private information is represented by a partition of a ﬁnite set of states of nature.1
Agents trade before knowing in which set of their partition lies the actual state
of nature (trade is made ex ante under private and imperfect state veriﬁcation).
This is a usual setting in the contract theory literature, particularly the notion
of events that are ‘observable, but not veriﬁable’, and the receiving of private
information after a contract has been signed - which is termed ‘hidden knowledge’
(Tirole, 1999).
In this context, the seminal contribution was made by Radner (1968), who re-
stricted agents to consume the same in states of nature that they did not dis-
tinguish. With this condition, the model of Arrow and Debreu (1954) could be
reinterpreted in a way that took into account each agent’s private information.2
Many useful and incentive compatible contracts are excluded by this restriction.
For example, the consumption of an agent that sells an option may not be the
same in states that the agent does not distinguish, because it depends on whether
another agent exercises the option or not. Consider the trading of a particular
kind of options: an agent that buys a bundle A and sells an option to get A
1Following the terminology of Laﬀont (1986), information is in the form of ﬁxed information
structures without noise.
2If trade occurred in the interim stage, that is, after agents receive their private information,
knowledge of the state space could allow agents to infer the actual state of nature from obser-
vation of prices, and arrive at a rational expectations equilibrium (Radner, 1979).
2for B, is sure of consuming either A or B (depending on whether the option is
exercised or not). This is what we call uncertain delivery: the agent has a list
of bundles and is certain of consuming one of the bundles in the list.
From the perspective of the agent, a combination of classical state-contingent
bundles, options of a particular kind, and contracts with default of a particular
kind, can be translated into a list for uncertain delivery. The list speciﬁes a ﬁnite
set of possible resulting consumption bundles, with the selection of the actual
bundle to be consumed being made by the market.
For a general treatment of contracts in a private information setting, the notion
of incentive compatibility is needed, as Holmstr¨ om and Myerson (1983) made
clear. The consideration of all incentive compatible trade contracts establishes
the attainable levels of welfare in the presence of private information. The task of
studying general equilibrium with incentive compatibility constraints was taken
up by Prescott and Townsend (1984a, 1984b), who used linear utility functions
to avoid the non-convexities of the incentive compatible set.3
A downside of taking the set of incentive compatible contracts as a foundation
lies in the very demanding informational requirements about the economy and its
whole state space. How can an agent know that a contract on the table is incentive
compatible? This would be possible in a context of imperfect information, with
agents knowing the space of states, or being able to transform the economy with
incomplete information into one of imperfect information (Harsanyi, 1967). With
complete information, this approach is the adequate. But in some contexts, as
in large market interactions, complete information may be considered a strong
requirement.4
Going back to the contribution of Radner (1968), we can observe that the drastic
3This is consistent with maximization of expected utility in a consumption space that is the
set of lotteries over a maximum of n possible bundles.
4The same information requirements are needed for a rational expectations equilibrium
(Radner, 1979) to arise. The whole economy has to be common information, otherwise agents
could not be able to infer the information of all the other agents in the economy simply by
observing equilibrium prices.
3‘measurability’ restriction avoids all these complications. There is no need for
common information assumptions. Furthermore, incentive compatibility is not
an issue, because a contract that promises delivery of the same bundle in states
of nature that the agent does not distinguish is necessarily incentive compatible.
The agent cannot be tricked and receive a diﬀerent bundle than the one that
corresponds to the actual state of nature. So, in the economy of Radner (1968),
agents do not need any knowledge about the space of states of the economy. It can
be assumed that they see a set of their partition of information as a single state.5
In our paper, this can also be assumed. Agents can be restricted to knowledge of
their own characteristics (that is, knowledge of their own possible types), being
ignorant about the characteristics of the other agents in the economy.
In the economy with uncertain delivery, agents buy the same lists for uncertain
delivery in states that they do not distinguish. Therefore, the impossibility of
observing the state of nature does not raise issues of incentive compatibility. In
states that agents do not distinguish, their ‘rights’ are the same: to receive one
of the bundles in the list. This is not a ‘measurability’ restriction on the possible
trades, but a way to formalize the consequences of incomplete state veriﬁcation.
Consider an agent that buys A1 (delivery of good A in state 1) and B2, but is
not able to verify whether the true state is 1 or 2. The agent may receive A1 and
B2, but may also receive A1 and B1, A2 and B1 or A2 and B2. That is, the agent
receives ‘good A or good B’ in states ‘1 and 2’. Observe that the agent receives
(A or B)1 and (A or B)2. This is the meaning of the lists and of the usually called
‘measurability restriction’. An agent can buy something that is not ‘measurable’,
but, in practice, the ‘set of alternatives that may be delivered’ is measurable - in
this case it is ‘A or B’ in both states that the agent does not distinguish.
Contracts for uncertain delivery are strongly related to incentive compatible
contracts. In a classical state-contingent contract, a state is announced and the
corresponding net trade is made. The contract is incentive compatible if it is in
the self-interest of the agents to announce the states truthfully. With contracts
5In the literature, several terms are used to describe the kind of uncertainty between states
which cannot be reduced to a prior probability assessment: Knightian uncertainty, true uncer-
tainty, irreducible uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance.
4for uncertain delivery, states are not even announced. Agents simply decide which
net trade to make. In spite of this diﬀerence, an incentive compatible contract
that delivers A in state 1 and B in state 2 results in the same consumption as
a list that delivers (A ∨ B) in both states 1 and 2. Since the former contract is
incentive compatible, the same incentives imply that the list also delivers A in
state 1 and B in state 2. For any incentive compatible trade, there is a “list”
that results in the same trade.
We can assume that agents do not have any additional information about the state
space, and that they cannot ﬁnd out whether some state-contingent delivery is
incentive compatible or not. The economy is not common information, agents
only know their own characteristics and the prevailing prices. They do not know
the endowments and preferences of the others, and aren’t able to ﬁgure them
out. This irreducible incompleteness of information will lead us to an alternative
equilibrium concept. Naturally, the outcome should have a lower welfare level
relatively to the model in which the economy is common information.
There is a recent literature on decision under ambiguity.6 For our purposes it
is enough to refer the work of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), who axiomatized
maxmin expected utility with multiple priors. The general idea is that agents
cannot reduce all their uncertainty into risk, and end up with a set of plausible
priors instead of a single one. In this setting, they evaluate expected utility using
the worst of the priors.7
We study economies with trade ex ante under incomplete and private state veriﬁ-
cation using the concept of uncertain delivery. The solution that we propose is a
prudent expectations equilibrium: with objects of choice being lists of bundles out
of which the market selects one for delivery, agents expect to receive the worst of
the possibilities speciﬁed in a list. The model of Arrow-Debreu is reinterpreted
to cover this situation, therefore, many classical results still hold: existence of
core and equilibrium, core convergence, continuity properties, etc.
6Following an early work by Arrow and Hurwicz (1972).
7This corresponds to inﬁnite uncertainty aversion in the more general decision making model
under ambiguity of Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005).
5Prudence, or, ambiguity aversion, leads agents to select bundles with the same
utility for consumption in states that they do not distinguish, and therefore to
obtain the same utility in states of nature that they do not distinguish.8 It is
a weaker restriction than equal consumption, therefore, the eﬃciency of trade
and welfare are improved relatively to the model of Radner (1968). On the other
hand, the welfare of an incentive compatible solution isn’t reached. This gives an
indication of the welfare cost of ambiguity.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we introduce the concept of
uncertain delivery and its relation with options and contracts with default; in sec-
tion 3 we discuss and justify prudent preferences over lists; section 4 includes ex-
amples that motivate the paper; the model of general equilibrium with uncertain
delivery is formalized in section 5 and characterized in section 6; in section 7, con-
cepts of core in economies with uncertain delivery are introduced and commented;
in section 8 we conclude the paper with some remarks.
8Agents actually receive the worse of the possibilities in the list (this is trivial, because all
possibilities are equally good/bad in equilibrium), thus their expectations are fulﬁlled and we
can talk about an expectational equilibrium.
62 Uncertain Delivery
The theory of general equilibrium under uncertainty has developed upon the
formulation of objects of choice as contingent consumption claims (Arrow, 1953).
Under this formulation, besides being deﬁned by their physical properties and
their location in space and time, commodities are also deﬁned by the state of
nature in which they are made available. This incorporation of uncertainty in the
commodity space allows an interpretation of the Walrasian model that covers the
case of uncertainty.
The Arrow-Debreu (1954) economy with uncertainty extends over two time pe-
riods. In the ﬁrst period, agents know their preferences and endowments, which
depend on the state of nature. In this ex ante stage, agents trade state-dependent
endowments for state-dependent consumption goods. In the second period, the
state of nature becomes public information, trade is realized, and consumption
takes place.
In the presence of private information, the state of nature does not become public
information. In this case, agents have to be careful when trading contingent
goods. Suppose that the market oﬀers you the following game:
“I will toss a coin. If the result is heads, you receive a bicycle; if it is tails,
you don’t receive anything.”
If it is common information that the agent does not observe the coin toss, this
contingent good has no value because the market is able to report heads and
avoid delivery.
Assuming that agents only trade goods contingent on events that they can ob-
serve, Radner (1968) extended the model of Arrow and Debreu to the case of
private information.9 This restriction implies incentive compatibility. Whatever
9Private information was introduced in the model simply by restricting the agent’s
consumption set to values that imply equal consumption in states of nature that the agent does
not distinguish. Technically, consumption must be Pi-measurable, where Pi is the σ-algebra
that represents the private information of agent i.
7the state of nature that occurs, agents are always sure about the bundle that will
be delivered to them, so they can never be deceived.
But an agent may accept delivery of diﬀerent bundles in states of nature that she
does not distinguish. Suppose that the market oﬀers a diﬀerent game:
“I will toss a coin. If the result is heads, you receive a blue bicycle; if it is
tails, you receive a red bicycle.”
Even if it is common information that the agent does not observe the coin toss,
this is a valuable uncertain contingent good, because the delivery of a “bicycle”
is guaranteed.
In our model, agents are allowed to buy “contracts for uncertain delivery” or
“lists”, which specify a list of bundles out of which the market selects one for
delivery. These contracts can also be contingent upon events.10 A “contingent
list” gives the right to one of the bundles in the list if the speciﬁed contingency
occurs.
These objects of choice are more general than contingent consumption claims.11
Actually, the possible trades are, in a certain sense, the incentive compatible
trades. To see this, consider an incentive compatible contract delivering x1 in
state ω1 and x2 in state ω2. This contract can be substituted by a contract for
uncertain delivery of (x1 ∨ x2). The fact that the former contract is incentive
compatible implies that the contract for uncertain delivery also delivers x1 in ω1
and x2 in ω2.
Included in the deﬁnition of contract for uncertain delivery is the trading of a
particular kind of options. Suppose that an agent buys a bundle x while selling
an option to make a net trade y − x. The ﬁnal consumption bundle will be x if
the “market” does not exercise the option, and y if the option is exercised. The
corresponding list for uncertain delivery can be written as (x ∨ y).
10An ‘event’ is a set of states of nature. It is said to ‘occur’ if the actual state of nature
belongs to the set.
11Notice that contracts for contingent delivery (Arrow, 1953) can be seen as “contracts for
uncertain delivery” with lists of only one element.
8The trading of a particular kind of contracts with default clauses is also covered
by this deﬁnition. Suppose that an agent buys the bundle x, but gives the market
the possibility of defaulting the contract and delivering bundle y as a penalty. The
resulting uncertain bundle is, again, (x ∨ y).
An agent that trades state-contingent bundles, this particular kind of options, and
this particular kind of contracts with default, can calculate the list of possible
outcomes.12 The actual outcome will depend on the choice of the market. In this
setting, the objects of choice are lists for uncertain delivery.
12We put a ﬁnite bound, K, on the number of possible outcomes in order to work in a ﬁnite
dimensional space.
93 Prudent preferences
With agents selecting among uncertain bundles, it is necessary to extend the do-
main in which preferences are deﬁned. What is the utility of receiving “x1 or x2”?
In this paper we use maxmin preferences (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989).13 Agents
attribute to the uncertain bundle (x1 ∨ x2) the utility of the worst possibility:
U(x1 ∨ x2) = min{u(x1),u(x2)}.
Contingent bundles which are constant in states that the agent does not distin-
guish can be seen as contingent lists with only one element. In this case, prudent
utility is clearly equal to the usual expected utility. This formulation of prudent
utility extends the utility functions to a domain that also includes lists, preserving
the values in the original consumption space.
The motivation for the use of prudent preferences is essentially the same of the
literature on decision making under ambiguity (Schmeidler, 1989). Agents are
assumed to be completely ignorant with respect to the diﬀerences between states
that their information structures do not allow them to distinguish. Therefore,
they cannot reduce their uncertainty about which of the bundles in the list will
be delivered into a simple prior.
Consider, for example, an agent going to the market and being oﬀered a “bicycle
or car”. The agent clearly will expect to receive the “bycicle” with (at least)
almost certainty. Given their ignorance of the state space, agents may behave
defensively, expecting the worst outcome in order to avoid being deceived by the
market.14
If the bundles are actually portfolios that give a money return, then it is realistic
for the agents to expect that the worst possibility is going to be delivered. Suppose
13These preferences can also be seen as a degenerate case of Choquet expected utilities
(Schmeidler, 1989) since the whole weight is placed on the worst possible utility.
14If the good deﬁned as a “bicycle or car” had a price higher than the good deﬁned as a
“bicycle”, then an arbitrageur could earn some proﬁt by buying “bicycles” and selling “bicycles
or cars”.
10that there is an additional round of trade. Agents evaluate the utility of bundles
(portfolios) by their value in the second round of trade. The market (seller) does
exactly the same valuation. In this case, the market always delivers the bundle
with the lowest (ex-post) value, so this worst bundle is what the buyer always
receives.
Axiomatization
The following analysis resembles the work of Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) on opti-
mality criteria for decision making under ignorance. By “ignorance” it is meant
that the agent has no prior probabilities on the occurrence of diﬀerent states,
perceiving them as a single state.
Only the “prudent preferences” satisfy the two assumptions made precise below.
The ﬁrst is a kind of independence, and the second is related to realism. According
to the ﬁrst, substituting one possibility in a list by another that has greater utility
does not make the list less attractive.
(P1) xj  yj , ∀j = 1,...,k ⇒ (x1 ∨ ... ∨ xk)  (y1 ∨ ... ∨ yk).
Suppose that an agent is indiﬀerent between receiving a “blue bicycle” and a
“red bicycle”. What utility should be assigned to the delivery of a “blue bicycle
or red bicycle”? Some agents may prefer to know what will be delivered in the
future, while others may prefer to be surprised. A corollary of P1 is that agents
are neutral with respect to surprise:
∀x1,...,xk : x1 ∼ ... ∼ xk ⇒ (x1 ∨ ... ∨ xk) ∼ x1 ∼ ... ∼ xk.
It is easy to see that P1 implies that the utility of a list cannot be lower than the
utility of the worst possibility. Assuming that the least preferred bundle is x1:
xj  x1 , ∀j = 1,...,k ⇒ (x1 ∨ ... ∨ xk)  (x1 ∨ ... ∨ x1) ∼ x1.
The second property means that an agent is indiﬀerent between a bundle x1 and
a list with x1 and x1 + a, where a ≥ 0. If the market keeps the contract by
delivering x1, why would make the eﬀort to deliver the additional a? The agent
realistically expects to receive always x1, and never x1 + a.
11(P2) ∀x1,...,xk : xk+1 ≥ xk ⇒ (x1 ∨ ... ∨ xk ∨ xk+1) ∼ (x1 ∨ ... ∨ xk).
To see that P1 and P2 together imply maxmin preferences, assume that
preferences satisfy P1 and P2. Introducing an alternative such as xk+1 ≥ xk
does not increase the utility of the list, and, by P1, introducing an alternative
that is less attractive than xk+1 also does not. Thus there isn’t any additional
alternative that increases the utility of the list.
∀x1,...,xk,xk+1 : (x1 ∨ ... ∨ xk ∨ xk+1)  (x1 ∨ ... ∨ xk).
Under P1 and P2, agents behave with prudence, being indiﬀerent between the
uncertain bundle and the worst possibility:
x1  xj , ∀j = 1,...,k ⇒ (x1 ∨ ... ∨ xk) ∼ x1 ⇔




In this section, we give two examples of trading between two agents who do not
have any common information. As a result, if agents are constrained to consume
the same in states that they do not distinguish, there is no trade in equilibrium.
With contracts for uncertain delivery, agents can trade and, as a result, welfare
improves in the sense of Pareto.
Example 1: Perfect substitutes
This economy has two agents and four commodities: “ham sandwiches”, “cheese
sandwiches”, “orange juices” and “apple juices”. Sandwiches are perfect sub-
stitutes, as well as the juices. Agents want to eat and drink. Precisely, they
maximize expected utility, having state-contingent preferences described by a
Cobb-Douglas utility function:
u = (sh + sc)0.5 · (jo + ja)0.5.
There are four possible states of nature, Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3,ω4}.
- In ω1, agent A is endowed with two “ham sandwiches” and agent B with
two “orange juices”: eA(ω1) = (2,0,0,0) and eB(ω1) = (0,0,2,0);
- In ω2, agent A is endowed with two “ham sandwiches” and agent B with
two “apple juices”: eA(ω2) = (2,0,0,0) and eB(ω2) = (0,0,0,2);
- In ω3, agent A is endowed with two “cheese sandwiches” and agent B with
two “orange juices”: eA(ω3) = (0,2,0,0) and eB(ω3) = (0,0,2,0);
- In ω4, agent A is endowed with two “cheese sandwiches” and agent B with
two “apple juices”: eA(ω4) = (0,2,0,0) and eB(ω4) = (0,0,0,2).
Each agent observes only its endowments. The information partitions are:
PA = {{ω1,ω2},{ω3,ω4}} and PB = {{ω1,ω3},{ω2,ω4}}.
13Agents want to guarantee that they will eat and drink in the future. The problem
is that they are unable to make trades contingent upon events (sets of states)
that they observe. For example, agent A would like to consume orange juice. For
consumption to be the same across undistinguished states, the delivery of orange
juice must be the same in ω1 and ω2 and the same in ω3 and ω4. This is not
possible, because agent B only has orange juice in the states ω1 and ω3. The
same reasoning applies to each of the other commodities, so there is no trade in
the economy.15
Nevertheless, contracts for uncertain delivery allow agents to guarantee future
consumption of a sandwich and a juice. The agents can agree to deliver a “sand-
wich” for a “juice” in the second period. This constitutes a contract for uncertain
delivery in which one of the agents gets the right to receive an “orange juice or
apple juice”, while the other gets the right to receive a “ham sandwich or cheese
sandwich”.
Delivery of an “orange juice or apple juice” may be seen as a contract with a de-
fault clause, in which the agent should deliver an “orange juice”, but may default
and pay an “apple juice” as penalty. It may also be seen as the combination of a
contract for the delivery of an “orange juice”, with an option to get the “orange
juice” in exchange for an “apple juice”.
Since agent A is able to ensure the delivery of a sandwich and agent B is able to
ensure the delivery of a juice, this contract for uncertain delivery allows them to
attain the optimal outcome:
xA = xB =

       





Both agents obtain an utility that is equal to 1 in all states of nature. This
constitutes an improvement in the sense of Pareto relatively to the Walrasian
15It should be clear that we can assume strictly positive endowments, substituting every zero
for a small , and reach similar conclusions.
14expectations equilibrium solution, which resulted in an utility of zero to both
agents.
Example 2 - Risk sharing
Consider an economy with two agents, two goods and three states of nature.













The state ω2 has a probability of 0,2%, while ω1 and ω3 have a probability of
49,9%. Agents know these probabilities but there are no commonly observed
events:
PA = {{ω1},{ω2,ω3}} and PB = {{ω1,ω2},{ω3}}.
Agents want to maximize expected utility, having the same preferences in all
states of nature. The marginal utility of good 1 is decreasing, while marginal
utility of good 2 is constant:
uA(x1,x2) = uB(x1,x2) = 10
√
x1 + x2.
Observe the symmetry in the economy: agent A wants to sell good 1 in ω1 and
to buy in {ω2,ω3}, while agent B wants to buy in {ω1,ω2} and to sell in ω3.
The total resources in the economy are:
etotal =

   




Restricting consumption to be the same in states that agents do not distinguish,
Pareto improvements relatively to the initial endowments are not possible. But,
as in example 1, contracts for uncertain delivery allow agents to improve their
welfare.
With prudent preferences, the equilibrium allocation is:
15xA =

   












   










Agents can obtain this allocation by trading an option. In every state of nature,
each agent has the option to get 90 units of good 2 in exchange for 99 units
of good 1. This is equivalent to uncertain delivery of (99,−90) or (0,0). It is
straightforward to see that agent A exercises the option in state 1 and agent B
exercises the option in state 3.
165 General Equilibrium with Uncertain Delivery
The model of the economy with uncertain delivery is based on the model known as
a diﬀerential information economy, but with a modiﬁed informational restriction.
Agents have incomplete and private state veriﬁcation, represented by a partition
on a ﬁnite set of states of nature. As a result, if they buy diﬀerent rights for
delivery in states that they cannot distinguish, then they have to accept any
delivery that is compatible with their information (that is, compatible with their
limited ability to verify the state of nature).
It is very important to understand the meaning and impact of private information
in this model. Consider an agent that buys A1 (delivery of good A in state 1)
and B2, but is not able to verify whether the true state of nature is 1 or 2. As
a consequence, the agent may receive A1 and B2, but may also receive A1 and
B1, A2 and B1 or A2 and B2. That is, the agent receives ‘good A or good B’ in
states ‘1 and 2’. Observe that the agent receives (A or B)1 and (A or B)2 - the
same ‘list’ in states of nature that are not distinguished. This is the meaning of
the ‘lists’ and of the usually called ‘measurability restriction’. An agent can buy
something that is not ‘measurable’, but, in practice, the ‘set of alternatives that
may be delivered’ is measurable - in this case it is ‘A or B’ in both states that
the agent does not distinguish.
We restrict agents to select the same list for delivery in states that they do
not distinguish (instead of the same bundle as in Radner (1968) and Yannelis
(1991)). Technically, the list must be Pi-measurable, which does not imply that
consumption is Pi-measurable.16.
To get familiar with the workings of the model and with the notation that is used,
consider three possible states of nature, Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3}, and an agent who does
not distinguish ω1 from ω2. Instead of observing prices in ω1, ω2 and ω3, it may be
assumed that the the agent only observes prices for delivery in the events {ω1,ω2}
and ω3. In the economy with uncertain delivery, besides announcing the prices of
16In their study of implementation in diﬀerential information economies, Postlewaite and
Schmeidler (1986) do not impose any measurability restriction on the outcome.
17the bundles, the market also reports the prices of lists.17 Denote the price of the
list (x1∨x2) in ω1 by ˜ p1(x1∨x2). It may be assumed that the agent only observes
the price of (x1 ∨ x2) in the event {ω1,ω2}, that is, ˜ p1(x1 ∨ x2) + ˜ p2(x1 ∨ x2).
Suppose that an agent buys the list ˜ x = [(x1 ∨ x2),(x1 ∨ x2),x3]. To keep this
contract for uncertain delivery, the market must deliver one of the four contingent
bundles: (x1,x1,x3), (x1,x2,x3), (x2,x1,x3), (x2,x2,x3). It is as if a ﬁctitious in-
termediary had to guarantee delivery of one of the alternatives. The intermediary
would buy the cheapest contingent bundle satisfying the requirements of the list
and deliver it to the agent. For the list to be deliverable, its price cannot be lower
than the price of the cheapest alternative.
˜ p1(x1 ∨ x2) + ˜ p2(x1 ∨ x2) ≥ min{p1 · x1,p1 · x2} + min{p2 · x1,p2 · x2}.
The price of the list (x1 ∨ x2) in the event {ω1,ω2} cannot be higher than the
price of the cheapest alternative. If it were, there would be an opportunity for
arbitrage. Another intermediary could buy the cheapest alternative and sell the
list with proﬁt. This no-proﬁt condition prevents prices of options from being
negative.18
˜ p1(x1 ∨ x2) + ˜ p2(x1 ∨ x2) ≤ min{p1 · x1,p1 · x2} + min{p2 · x1,p2 · x2}.
In sum, given the prices of the contingent goods, the supply curve of a list is
a vertical line passing on the price of the cheapest contingent bundle satisfying
the requirements of the list. The price of a list is equal to the minimum of the
prices of the contingent bundles satisfying its requirements of the list. This gives
a unique extension of prices from the space of goods to the space of lists. The
price of the list (x1 ∨ ... ∨ xk) to be delivered in state ωs is:
˜ ps(x1 ∨ ... ∨ xk) = min
j=1,...,k
ps · xj.
With this restriction on the prices of lists, it is enough to ﬁnd equilibrium prices
for the contingent commodities. The prices of the lists follow directly from those.
17Bundles are ‘lists’ with a single element.
18Observe that a list (A∨B) can be seen obtained by buying bundle A and selling an option
to get A for B.
18When an agent buys a list, the cheapest bundle satisfying the requirements of
the lists plays a fundamental role. It is the bundle that chosen for delivery, and,
furthermore, its price is equal to the price of the list.
Finding the bundles actually delivered by the market allows us to ﬁnd equilibrium
lists selected by the agents. From all the lists compatible with the given delivery,
the list selected by a maximizing agent is the most preferred one, since all of them
have the same price (the price of the delivered bundle).
With ‘prudent preferences’, we know that additional alternatives never increase
the utility of a list. Then, the list selected for a given state can be constructed
using the alternatives delivered in states that the agent does not distinguish from
this state. For example, an agent may receive a consumption bundle that is
not Pi-measurable, x = (x1,x2,x3). It can be induced that this would be the
result of buying the Pi-measurable list ˜ x = [(x1 ∨x2),(x1 ∨x2),x3]. No other list
compatible with the delivery of xi has strictly higher utility.
The Model
The economy extends over two time periods. In the ﬁrst, agents trade their state-
contingent endowments for state-contingent lists. In the second period agents
receive (and consume) one of the bundles that corresponds to a state that they
do not distinguish from the actual state of nature.
Consider a ﬁnite number of agents, commodities and states of nature. In the
economy with uncertain delivery, E ≡ (ei,ui,Pi,qi)n
i=1, for each agent i:
- A partition of Ω, Pi, represents the private information of the agent. Sets
that belong to Pi are denoted A
j
i. The set of states of nature that agent i
does not distinguish from ωk is denoted Pi(ωk).
- Agents assign subjective probabilities to the diﬀerent elementary events
that they observe. To each set A
j








19- Preferences over consumption bundles are the same in undistinguished




+ → IR+, which are assumed to be continuous, weakly monotone
and concave.
- The initial endowments are constant across undistinguished states, and
strictly positive: e
j
i  0 for all j.
The objective function, prudent expected utility, is:

























Knowing the bundle that the agent receives, we know that the utility of the list
that the agent bought is the same. It could not be higher, because the agent
evaluates the list according to the worst alternative. If it were lower, then the







The utility of this list is the same as the bundle delivered, and has the same price
(remember the equality between the prices of lists and the prices of the actually
delivered bundles). Since the price and the utility of a list is equal to the price
and utility of the delivered bundle, the problem of the consumer can be written











Prudence is incorporated in the objective function. Agent i knows that the state
of nature that occurred belongs to some A
j
i, and that she has the right to receive
one of the bundles xs
i with ωs ∈ A
j
i. Under prudent expectations, the utility that












19Note that if x is equal across states that the agent does not distinguish, then prudent
20From the properties of the state-dependent utility functions, u
j
i, it is shown below
that the prudent expected utility function is also concave.






















































































= λUi(xi) + (1 − λ)Ui(yi).
Therefore, the model of Arrow-Debreu can be reinterpreted to cover the case of an
economy with uncertain delivery in which agents are prudent. The economy with
uncertain delivery is equivalent to an Arrow-Debreu economy, EAD ≡ (ei,Ui)n
i=1,
where, for each agent i:
- Preferences are described by an utility function, Ui : IRΩl
+ → IR+,
























- The vector of initial endowments, ei ∈ IRΩl
+ , is strictly positive.
With the economy formalized as an Arrow-Debreu economy, the usual deﬁnitions









We normalize the price functions to the simplex of IRΩl, that is:







expected utility is equal to classical expected utility. If agents are perfectly informed this always
occurs. With symmetric information, the transformed model is equivalent to the classical model
of Arrow and Debreu (1954).













A pair (p∗,x∗) is a Walrasian equilibrium with prudent expectations if p∗ is a price
system and x∗ = (x∗
1,...,x∗
n) is a feasible allocation such that, for every i, x∗
i ∈ IRΩl
+
maximizes prudent expected utility, Ui, on Bi(p∗,ei).
Private information was introduced in the model of Arrow and Debreu by a
transformation of the preferences. This transformation preserves the properties
of continuity, weak monotonicity and concaveness. Therefore, several classical
results still hold: existence of core and Walrasian equilibrium, core convergence,
continuity properties, etc.20
The following theorem can be stated without proof.
Theorem 1 There exists a Walrasian equilibrium with prudent expectations.
As seen before, from the equilibrium deﬁned on allocations, (x∗,p∗), we can de-
termine the equilibrium deﬁned on the space of lists, (˜ x∗, ˜ p∗).
20This framework also allows the analysis of continuity properties of equilibrium with respect
to information as a problem of continuity with respect to preferences, which was settled by
Hildenbrand and Mertens (1972).
226 Characteristics of Equilibrium
Utility is Pi-measurable
In this extended Arrow-Debreu model, equilibrium allocations are characterized
by the fact that in states of nature that an agent does not distinguish, the utility
of the delivered bundles tends to be equal. Instead of imposing consumption to be
Pi-measurable, as Radner (1968) and Yannelis (1991), we see a weaker restriction
of Pi-measurable utility arising naturally.
If equilibrium prices of the contingent commodities aren’t strictly positive, then
the utility of some equilibrium allocations may diﬀer across undistinguished
states. But we can reﬁne the equilibrium set by removing a free component
of excess supply. With the same equilibrium prices, the resulting equilibrium
allocations have Pi-measurable utility. The following results make this precise.
Theorem 2 Let (x∗,p∗) be a Walrasian equilibrium with prudent expectations.
Then, for each agent i, x∗
i = y∗
i +zi, with y∗
i having the same utility in states that
the agent does not distinguish, and zi being “free”. Precisely:
y∗
i ∈ IRΩl






+ and such that: p∗ · zi = 0.
Proof. Recall that for any ω0 ∈ Pi(ω), preferences are the same: uω
i = uω0
i . Now





i(ω0)). Then, there exists some δ < 1 such that uω




Whenever this occurs, modify the allocation accordingly to obtain y∗
i ≤ x∗
i. This
allocation has Pi-measurable utility. If y∗
i belongs to the interior of the budget set,
there exists a positive  such that the allocation (1+)·y∗
i belongs to the budget
set and has higher utility than x∗
i. In this case, x∗ would not be an equilibrium
allocation, and we would have a contradiction. Therefore, y∗
i is not in the interior
of the budget set, that is: zi = x∗
i − y∗
i is such that p∗ · zi = 0. QED
With agents obtaining the same utility in states that they do not distinguish,
prudent expected utility is equal to expected utility, for any prior probabilities
























The pair (y∗,p∗) is also a Walrasian equilibrium with prudent expectations. But,
since y∗ gives the same utility in states that agents do not distinguish, the prudent
behavior is not shown to have been unjustiﬁed. It never happens that an agent
was expecting the worst and got something better. Prudent expectations are, in
a certain sense, self-fulﬁlled. This constitutes a natural reﬁnement of the concept
of equilibrium.
A pair (y∗,p∗) is a “prudent expectations equilibrium” if p∗ is a price system and
y∗ = (y∗
1,...,y∗
n) is a feasible allocation such that, for every i, y∗
i ∈ IRΩl
+ maximizes
Ui on Bi(p∗,ei) with ui(y∗
i) being Pi-measurable.
Corollary 1 Given any Walrasian equilibrium with prudent expectations,
(x∗,p∗), there exists a prudent expectations equilibrium, (y∗,p∗) under the same
price system (y∗ as deﬁned in Theorem 1).
Proof. The allocation y∗ has the same prudent expected utilities as the
equilibrium allocation x∗: Ui(y∗) = Ui(x∗), for all i. Under the price system
p∗, both allocations cost the same: p∗ · y∗
i = p∗ · x∗
i, for all i. Thus, y∗ is also
allowed by each agent’s budget restriction, and maximizes utility. Furthermore,
since y∗ ≤ x∗, y∗ is feasible. QED
An important consequence is the existence of equilibrium allocations with Pi-
measurable utility. If instead of restricting agents to consume the same in states
that they do not distinguish, we restrict them to consume bundles with the same
utility, equilibrium existence is guaranteed.
Corollary 2 There exists a prudent expectations equilibrium.
There exists a Walrasian equilibrium of the Arrow-Debreu economy, so this is an
obvious consequence of Corollary 1.
24From Theorem 2, it is straightforward that if the contingent commodities have
strictly positive prices, p∗ >> 0, then z = 0 and x∗ = y∗. That is, all Walrasian
equilibria with prudent expectations have Pi-measurable utility. A condition that
guarantees strict positivity of the prices of the contingent commodities is suﬃcient
to guarantee that all Walrasian equilibria with prudent expectations are prudent
expectations equilibria. For example, if every state is observed by at least one
agent.
Measurability implies incentive compatibility
A measurability restriction is still present. In states of nature that agents do
not distinguish, they are entitled to receive the same lists. The impossibility of
observing the state of nature is not a problem. The agent does not fear being
“tricked”, because the rights are the same in states that the agent does not
distinguish: to receive one of the bundles in the list.
In sum, the consideration of contracts for uncertain delivery allows us to relax in
a natural way the measurability assumption, while preserving incentive compati-
bility. This enlarges the space of allocations, improving the eﬃciency of exchange,
relatively to economies in which consumption has to be measurable with respect
to private information.
Welfare improves
Compared with measurable consumption, measurable utility is less restrictive, as
it allows agents to select diﬀerent consumption bundles in states that they do not
distinguish. As a result, they take advantage of the variations in prices across
these states. The following theorem describes this and conﬁrms that the cheapest
bundle is chosen for delivery.
Theorem 3 Let (x∗,p∗) be a Walrasian equilibrium with prudent expectations.
ω0 ∈ Pi(ω) ⇒ p∗(ω) · x∗
i(ω) ≤ p∗(ω) · x∗
i(ω0).
25Proof. Suppose that for some ω0 ∈ Pi(ω), we had p∗(ω) · x∗
i(ω) > p∗(ω) · x∗
i(ω0).
Designate by yi a modiﬁed bundle with y∗
i(ω) = x∗
i(ω0) being the only diﬀerence
relatively to x∗
i. This bundle has the same utility and allows the agent to retain
some income. There exists a positive  such that (1+)·yi belongs to the budget
set and has higher utility than x∗
i. Contradiction! QED
In spite of the penalization implied by prudence, prudent expected utility is higher
in the sense of Pareto than that which is attainable under the classical restriction
of equal consumption in states of nature that are not distinguished.
Theorem 4 Let (x∗,p∗) be an equilibrium in the sense of Radner (1968).
There are Pareto optima of the economy with uncertain delivery, z, such that
Ui(zi) ≥ Ui(x∗
i), for every agent. The improvement may be strict (see section 3).
Proof. The proof is straightforward. If (x∗,p∗) is an equilibrium in the sense
of Radner (1968), the allocation x∗ is still feasible in the economy with prudent
expectations. QED
From this result it does not follow that a prudent expectations equilibrium repre-
sents a Pareto-improvement relatively to the Walrasian expectations equilibrium.
For example, a perfectly informed agent has no interest in uncertain delivery, and
the change in equilibrium prices associated with the introduction of uncertain
delivery may imply a decrease in the utility of this agent.
Ex post eﬃciency
In this model, trade was made ex ante, that is, before agents received their
information. But what happens if, after receiving their equilibrium bundles,
agents are allowed to trade again?
If equilibrium prices are strictly positive, then the equilibrium allocation is
ex post eﬃcient. This means that, for any given state of nature, there is
no allocation that Pareto-improves the state-contingent prudent expectations
equilibrium allocation. The reopening of markets has no eﬀect. There is no
trade.
26Theorem 5 Let (x∗,p∗) be a prudent expectations equilibrium.
If prices are strictly positive, p∗ >> 0, then every state-contingent allocation,
x∗(ω), is Pareto-eﬃcient.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a feasible y(ω) that weakly dominates x∗(ω):
∀j : yj(ω) j,ω x∗
j(ω), and ∃i : yi(ω) i,ω x∗
i(ω).
From continuity, we know that there exists a small  > 0 such that:
∃i : (1 − )yi(ω) i,ω x∗
i(ω).
Redistribute the wealth, p∗(ω) · yi(ω), among all the other state-contingent
bundles, and construct an alternative to x∗
i as follows:
x0
i = ((1 + 2)x∗
i(1),(1 + 2)x∗
i(2),...,(1 − )yi(ω),...).
Observe that, clearly: x0
i i x∗
i. This implies that: p∗ · x0
i > p∗ · x∗
i.
In state ω, all the other agents are not worse oﬀ with yj(ω) than with x∗
j(ω).
Again, by a continuity argument, we know that:
∀j 6= i : p∗(ω) · y0
j(ω) = p∗(ω) · x∗
j(ω).





j(2),...,yj(ω),...), ∀j 6= i.
For all j 6= i: x0
j j x∗
j. Since x∗ is an equilibrium: p∗ · x0
j ≥ p∗ · x∗
j, ∀j 6= i.
Summing over agents, we have:
Pn
j=1 p∗ · x0
j >
Pn
j=1 p∗ · x∗
j =
Pn
j=1 p∗ · ej.
An inequality that implies that x0 is not feasible, which in turn implies that y(ω)
is not feasible. QED21
21We proved this result while working with Nuno Gouveia.
277 Cooperative Solutions: the Prudent Cores
In a cooperative setting it seems more diﬃcult to justify that agents cannot reach
the incentive compatible solution. Again, in a context of Knightian uncertainty a
solution based on prudence and uncertain delivery can make sense. Conceptually,
it may be placed between the private core (Yannelis, 1991) and the incentive
compatible core.
Restricting our analysis to the case of prudent expectations, the core concept
follows from the analysis in section 5. The economy with uncertain delivery and
prudent expectations was formalized as an Arrow-Debreu economy. The core of
this Arrow-Debreu economy is the “prudent core”.







ei and Ui(yi) > Ui(xi) for every i ∈ S, where Ui is the prudent
expected utility of agent i.
The “prudent core” is the set of all feasible allocations which are not prudently
blocked by any coalition. Although coalitions of agents are formed, information
is not shared between them. The prudent expected utility is based only on each
agent’s private information.
The prudent core is similar to a private core in which measurable utility is required
instead of measurable consumption. An allocation without Pi-measurable utility
may belong to the prudent core, but then there exists another allocation with
the same utility for every agent, which has Pi-measurable utility and requires less
resources.







28Proof. If ui(xi) isn’t Pi-measurable, we can multiply the xi(ω) that have higher
utilities in each element of Pi by a factor smaller than 1 to obtain a modiﬁed
allocation with measurable utility. These higher utilities are not taken into
account in the calculation of prudent expected utility, because only the worst
outcome is considered. Therefore, expected utility remains unchanged and this
allocation satisﬁes x0
i ≤ xi. QED
Even being penalized by the prudence, allocations in the prudent core dominate,
in the sense of Pareto, those in the private core (Yannelis, 1991). The latter are
always feasible in the economy with uncertain delivery, while the converse is not
true.
It is also possible to deﬁne a “prudent coarse core” and a “prudent ﬁne core”. In
the prudent coarse core, prudence is based on common information.









iS(xi) for every i ∈ S, where Us
iS is the
“strongly S-prudent expected utility” of agent i in the coalition S. The interim
utility for agent i in coalition S is calculated using the minimum utility across
states that the coalition cannot distinguish using only the common information
among the members.
Analogously, the prudent ﬁne core is based on pooled information.









iS(xi) for every i ∈ S, where Uw
iS is
the “weakly S-prudent expected utility” of agent i in the coalition S. The interim
utility for agent i in coalition S is calculated using the minimum utility across
states that the coalition cannot distinguish using the pooled information of its
members.
In any case, welfare is improved in the prudent cores with respect to the deﬁnitions
in which Pi-measurability is required. On the other hand, the welfare of the
incentive compatible core cannot be reached in general.
298 Concluding Remarks
In the presence of private information in the form of incomplete state veriﬁcation,
general equilibrium theory in lines of the article of Radner (1968) cannot cope
with widely used contracts, like options and contracts with default. In this paper,
objects of choice are lists of bundles out of which the market selects one for
delivery. This notion encompasses that of of objects of choice as contingent
consumption claims (Arrow, 1953), allowing the study of more complex trade
environments.
Under the assumption that agents have an extremely defensive behavior, the
model of Arrow-Debreu can be reinterpreted to cover this situation. Therefore,
many classical results still hold: existence of core and equilibrium, core conver-
gence, continuity properties, etc. Expecting to receive the worst of the possibil-
ities contracted, agents select bundles with the same utility for consumption in
states that they do not distinguish. This improves welfare relatively to allocations
with measurable consumption.22
This equilibrium notion based on prudent behavior does not require agents to
have any information about the characteristics of the other agents. This is the
fundamental advantage relatively to the approach based on incentive compatibil-
ity. It is liable to criticism in contexts where agents have some information about
the characteristics of others and could use it to construct their expectations, or
in other settings in which cooperation is plausible.
While an intuition for the concept of rational expectations equilibrium was the
idea that “agents cannot be fooled”, in the prudent expectations equilibrium it is
the market that cannot be fooled. Agents use a rule of thumb which is related to
Murphy’s law: “if anything can go wrong, it will”.
22We have work in progress (2006) seeking to relax the assumption of “prudent” behavior.
Naturally, with the consideration of diﬀerent expectations, the result of measurable utility will
no longer be true.
30Whether the agents know or not the state space of the economy is an important
issue for the comparison between the two concepts. In this paper, agents do not
have information about the state space and therefore cannot evaluate whether a
contract in incentive compatible or not. As a result, their welfare falls short to
that attained when all the possible incentive compatible trades are considered.
Agents with rational expectations know the space of states and are able to calcu-
late correctly the probability of receiving each of the bundles in a list. But real
economic agents follow simple rules of decision, instead of making huge amounts
of calculations (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). This further justiﬁes the study
of equilibrium with agents constructing expectations in a simple way.
References
Arrow, K.J. (1953), “The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-Bearing”,
Econometrie, translated and reprinted in 1964, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 31,
pp. 91-96.
Arrow, K.J. and G. Debreu (1954), “Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive
Economy”, Econometrica, 22 (3), pp. 265-290.
Arrow, K.J. and L. Hurwicz (1972), “An Optimality Criterion for Decision Making
Under Ignorance”, In Uncertainty and Expectations in Economics: Essays in Honor of
G.L.S. Shackle, ed. C.F. Carter and J.L. Ford. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Correia-da-Silva, J. and C. Herv´ es-Beloso (2006), “Subjective expectations equilibrium
in economies with uncertain delivery”, FEP Working Papers, 190.
Debreu, G. (1959), “Theory of Value”, Wiley, New York.
Gilboa, I. and D. Schmeidler (1989), “Maxmin expected utility with non-unique priors”,
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18, pp. 141153.
Harsanyi, J.C. (1967), “Games with Incomplete Information Played by ’Bayesian’ Play-
ers”, Parts I-III, Management Science, Vol. 14 (3, 5, 7), pp. 159-182, 320-324, 486-502.
Hildenbrand, W. and J.F. Mertens (1972), “Upper Hemi-Continuity of the Equilibrium-
Set Correspondence for Pure Exchange Economies”, Econometrica, 40, pp. 99-108.
31Holmstr¨ om, B. and R.B. Myerson (1983), “Eﬃcient and Durable Decision Rules with
Incomplete Information”, Econometrica, 51 (6), pp. 1799-1819.
Klibanoﬀ, P., M. Marinacci and S. Mukerji (2005), “A Smooth Model of Decision
Making Under Ambiguity”, Econometrica, 73 (6), pp. 1849-1892.
Postlewaite, A. and D. Schmeidler (1986), “Implementation in Diﬀerential Information
Economies”, Journal of Economic Theory, 39 (1), pp. 14-33.
Prescott, E.C. and R.M. Townsend (1984a), “Pareto Optima and Competitive
Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard”, Econometrica, 52 (1), pp. 21-46.
Prescott, E.C. and R.M. Townsend (1984b), “General Competitive Equilibria Analysis
in an Economy with Private Information”, International Economic Review, 25 (1), pp.
1-20.
Radner, R. (1968), “Competitive Equilibrium under Uncertainty”, Econometrica, 36
(1), pp. 31-58.
Radner, R. (1979), “Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the
Information Revealed by Prices”, Econometrica, 47 (3), pp. 655-678.
Schmeidler, D. (1989), “Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additiv-
ity”, Econometrica, 57 (3), pp. 571-587.
Tirole, J. (1999), “Incomplete Contracts: Where do we stand?”, Econometrica, 67 (4),
pp. 741-781.
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1974), “Judgement under uncertainty: heuristics and
biases”, Science, 185, pp. 1124-1131.
Von Neumann, J. and O. Morgenstern (1944), “Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior”, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Wilson, R. (1978), “Information, Eﬃciency, and the Core of an Economy”,
Econometrica, 46, pp. 807-816.
Yannelis, N.C. (1991), “The Core of an Economy with Diﬀerential Information”,
Economic Theory, 1, pp. 183-198.
32